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SURRENDER OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE ON
DELIVERY OF THE PROPERTY
CARL

H.

FULDA

The subject of documents of title is exhaustively regulated by the Uniform
State' and Federal Bills of Lading Acts,2 the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act3 and the Uniform Sales Act.: Civil liabilities are supplemented with
criminal sanctions 5 for the purpose of suppressing and preventing fraudulent
practices. This classic legislation brought harmony and order into a field
where confusion and disorder had reigned in the past.
Scrutiny of the statute books discloses, however, that here and there a
remnant of the past somehow managed to survive. In New York6 and in
a few other states 7 there are some old penal statutes which antedate the
uniform and federal legislation by decades; they make delivery of the goods
by a carrier without requiring surrender and cancellation of the outstanding
bill of lading a crime. In New York this statute has been frequently, but
not always successfully, invoked in civil litigation to support claims for
damages caused by omission to cancel a bill of lading on delivery, while no
'Adopted in New York in 1911 as Article 7 of the Personal Property Law. The
Act is now in force in twenty-seven states and in one territory. See 4 UNIFoi m LAWS
ANN. for Table of States.
'Approved August 29, 1916; 39 STAT. 538; 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 81-124.
'The Act is in force in all American jurisdictions except New Hampshire and South
Carolina. See 3 UNIFORm LAWS ANN. for Table of States. The Act was adopted in
New York in 1907 and is now part of the New York General Business Law (Article 9).
'Adopted in New York in 1911 as Article 5 of the Personal Property Law. The
Act is now in force in thirty-two states, two territories and in the District of Columbia.
See 1 UNiFoRm LAWS ANN. for Table of States. See NEW Yoai PERSONAL PROPERTY
LAW §§ 108-121, 156 (1); Uniform Sales Act §§ 27-40, 76 (1).
'NEW YoRx PERSONAL PROPmTY LAW §§ 230-236 (Uniform Bills of Lading Act
§§ 44-50); NEW YoRK GENERAL BusINEss LAW §§ 134-139 (Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act §§ 50-55) ; 49 U. S. C. A. § 121.
8
NEw YoRK PENAL LAW § 365. The section was derived from section 633 of the
Penal Code of 1881, which in turn goes back to chapter 326 of the Laws of 1858, as
amended by chapter 353 of the Laws of 1859 and chapter 440 of the Laws of 1866.
Section 365 provides that any person who, being the master, owner or agent of any
vessel, or officer or agent of any railway, express or transportation company, or otherwise being or representing any carrier,
"delivers to another any merchandise for which a bill of lading, receipt or
voucher has been issued unless such receipt or voucher bears upon its face
the words 'not negotiable,' plainly written or stamped, or unless such receipt
is surrendered to be canceled at the time of such delivery, or unless, in the
case of a partial delivery, a memorandum thereof is indorsed upon such receipt
or voucher, is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both."
The section does not apply where property is demanded by virtue of legal process,
Penal
Law § 366.
7
Aiu. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1937) §§ 948, 950; WIs. STAT. (1937) § 343.26.
The Washington (Remington's Rev. Stats., § 2647), Wyoming (Re-. Stats., § 12-107
[1931]) and Arkansas (Dig. of Stats., § 949 [1937]) statutes differ from the others
in so far as they provide for criminal punishment only in the event that the carrier
has failed to indemnify the holder of the document. See infra text to notes 71-75.
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criminal prosecutions against carriers have been reported. A reappraisal of
the old statute and its comparison with the modem law may therefore be
helpful to clarify the problem.
A document of title issued in negotiable form is transferred by endorsement.
The holder supposedly acquires title to the goods represented by the document. The issuer of the document must therefore be ready to deliver to the
holder, and if he does, he must withdraw the document from circulation
or invalidate it by cancellation in order to prevent its further use. Failure
to do so may entail grave consequences. Suppose a bank has financed a sale
of merchandise through a loan; the bill of lading has been endorsed to it
as security; default occurs, but the security is gone, because the carrier has
turned over the goods to the buyer without requiring surrender of the bill.
The same situation may arise with regard to warehouse receipts and warehousemen. Another illustration of the danger is the familiar case of the
seller who ships the goods under a bill of lading to his own order, instructing the carrier to notify the buyer on arrival of the shipment; the carrier
delivers the goods to the buyer without obtaining the bill; the buyer is
bankrupt and the shipper takes the licking, which would have been avoided
if the carrier had refused delivery to anyone unable to produce the document.
The Uniform and Federal Acts make the carrier generally liable for
misdelivery of the goods." They provide specifically for civil liability of
the carrier 9 or warehouseman'0 to a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable bill
of lading or warehouse receipt for failure to take up and cancel the document. But such omission is made a crime only by section 54 of the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act.1 Since that section has no counterpart in the
"See 49 U. S. C. A. § 90; NEW YoRK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 199 (Uniform
Bills of Lading Act § 13).

See also NEW YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 226 (Uni-

form Bills of Lading Act § 40) as to the effect of consignment of the goods to the
seller's
order.
9
NEW YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 200 (Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 14);
49 U. S. C. A. § 91:
...... If a carrier delivers goods for Which an order bill had been issued, the
negotiation of which would transfer the right to the possession of the goods,
and fails to take up and cancel the bill, such carrier shall be liable for failure
to deliver the goods to anyone who for value and in good faith purchases such
bill, whether such purchaser acquired title to the bill before or after the delivery
of the goods by the carrier and notwithstanding delivery was made to the
person entitled thereto."
As to partial delivery see Nav YoRK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 201 (Uniform Bills of
Lading Act § 15); 49 U. S. C. A. § 92.
"See NEW YoRK GENERAL BusINEss LAW § 98 (Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
§§ 11, 12).
'NEW YORK GENERAL Busiumss LAW § 138:
"A warehouseman, or any officer, agent or servant of a warehousenman who
delivers goods out of the possession of such warehouseman, knowing that a
negotiable receipt the negotiation of which would transfer the right to the possession of such goods is outstanding and uncanceled, without obtaining the
possession of such receipt at or before the time of such delivery, shall . . .be
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Uniform State and Federal Bills of Lading Acts, this discrepancy seems
to indicate that it was intended to subject carriers and warehousemen to a
different treatment. What justifies such differentiation? Do the still existing
state statutes such as section 365 of the New York Penal Law providing
for criminal sanctions against carriers who fail to cancel the bill merely
supplement the civil provisions of the Uniform State and Federal Acts,
or are they inconsistent with them? In the latter alternative, they must be
considered as repealed by implication. 12 Is delivery without cancellation to
be considered illegal and harmful per se, or is the rigidity of the criminal
law to be replaced by the more flexible rules of the law of torts which
recognize the necessity of admitting exceptions?
The problem is, of course, limited to negotiable documents of title. Where
the document is not negotiable, i.e., where the goods are consigned to a
specifically named person, such consignment constitutes notice to everybody
that the carrier or warehouseman will deliver to such person as the presumed
owner, unless he has knowledge of other claimants.' 3 Cancellation is therefore necessary only where the document is negotiable.' 4
found guilty of a crime. . .

."

The section does not apply where delivery is made

by court order, infra note 46, and Where the goods are sold under the provisions
of section 121 (Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act § 36).

2NEw YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 241 (Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 55)
declares all acts inconsistent with the Uniform Bills of Lading Act repealed. But see
New York Penal Law § 2500 which does not recognize the implied repeal of penal

statutes, and New York General Construction Law § 101 providing that the Consolidated Laws shall not be construed as affecting the Penal Law. Implied repeal of a
penal statute will be recognized only where the intention of the legislature is "clear
and unmistakable", People v. Dwyer, 215 N. Y. 46, 109 N. E. 103 (1915). Cf. United

States v. Borden Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 182, 188 (1939) : "When there are two acts upon
the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both, if possible."
aSee NEW YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 219 (1) (Uniform Bills of Lading Act
§ 33) ; 49 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1) ; Nebraska Meal Mills Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. Co., 64 Ark. 169, 41 S. W. 810, 38 L. R. A. 358 (1897) ; Ensign v. Illinois Central
App. 382, 386 (1913) ; Erskine Williams idumber Co. v. Hay, 160 So.
R. R. Co., 180 Ill.
650 (La. Ct. of App. 1935) ; Terracina v. Yazoo M. V. R. Co., 152 So. 771 (La. Ct.
of App. 1934) ; McCoy v. American Express Co., 253 N. Y. 477, 481, 171 N. E. 749
(1930); Gubelman v. Panama R. R. Co., 192 App. Div. 165, 182 N. Y. Supp. 403
(Ist Dep't 1920), aff'd w. o. op., 232 N., Y. 566, 134 N. E. 574 (1921); Chandler
Motor Car Co. v. United Fruit Co., 127 Misc. 432, 216 N. Y. Supp. 413 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd w. o. op., 222 App. Div. 726, 225 N. Y. Supp. 803 (1st Dep't 1927); Utley v.
See also City Nat.
Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 292 Pa. St. 251, 141 Atl. 53 (1928).
Bank v. El Paso & Northeastern R. R. Co., 262 U. S. 695, 43 Sup. Ct. 640 (1923)
where the holdifig is based on acquiescence in usage; Forbes v. Boston & Lowell R. R.
Co., 133 Mass. 154, 157 (1882) ; Edelstone v. Schimmel, 233 Mass. 45, 48, 123 N. E.
333 (1919) ; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Grayson County Nat. Bank,
100 Tex. 17, 22, 93 S. W. 431 (1906) ; Stacey-Vorwerk Co. v. Buck, 42 Wyo. 136, 291
Pac. 809 (1930), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 849, 51 Sup. Ct. 559 (1931) ; but where shipper,
who retained nonnegotiable bill of lading, learns of consignee's insolvency, he may
condition delivery on presentation of nonnegotiable bill, such condition being legitimate
exercise of right of stoppage in transit: Interstate Window Glass Co. v. New York,
N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 104 Conn. 342, 133 Atl. 102 (1926). See generally WmLISToN,
SALES (2d ed. 1924) §§ 285, 424; 4 R. C. L. 840.
"'Section 365 of the New York Penal Law does not adequately express this rule.
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Frequent attempts to hold issuers of such documents liable for delivery
of goods without requiring cancellation by no means establish a general notion
that such delivery deserves the stigma of an illegal or criminal act. At the
outset the New York courts viewed the question with severity. It is stated
that a carrier can never be too cautious in respect to the right of the person
to whom delivery is made and that there is no legal excuse for a wrong
delivery;15 therefore a carrier, who in good faith delivered to the consignee
without production and cancellation of the bill was held liable to the indorsee
of the bill, although such delivery was authorized in the written contract,
the command of the statute being construed as modification of the contract. 16
It was held that the statute forbids delivery, except accompanied by a
cancellation of the document, for the purpose of preventing the fraudulent
use of "spent bills," such prohibition- of delivery without cancellation being
generally required on account of "the business convenience of a safe and
easy transfer of bills of lading, and the danger of leaving the title they represent at the mercy of the consignee". 17 Such holding accurately reflects the
public policy behind the enactment: Bills of lading which do not actually
represent goods should be kept from floating around and thus furnishing
easy material for deception; "the existence of such bills is a source of
danger,"' 8 which might very well be compared with a public nuisance.
Therefore the strongest sanction of the law, criminal punishment, is deemed
necessary by the Legislature to eliminate such nuisance. But soon the courts
begin to waver. The statutory purpose to prevent damage by the use of
"spent bills" is invoked by a bank which had acquired the bill without
knowledge that the goods had previously been delivered to its transferor
as lawful holder of the document. The bill expressly stated that surrender
upon delivery'of the goods would be required. The bank, seeking to hold
the carrier for conversion, based its action on the provision of the bill and
on the criminal statute prohibiting delivery without cancellation. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the function of the bill had ceased
upon the delivery of the goods and that the plaintiff thereafter could not
proceed on the theory of conversion,' 9 a holding irreconcilable with the
MacDonald, Proposal to Simplify the Penal Law (1934)

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusricE IN NEw YomK STATE 863. See also Gubelman

v. Panama R. R. Co., supra note 13, to the effect that failure of the carrier to mark
a nonnegotiable bill of lading correctly does not render such bill negotiable.
2'Furman v. The Union Pacific R. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 579, 585, 13 N. E. 587 (1887).
Accord: Gates v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 42 Neb. 379, 60 N. W. 583 (1894).
"Colgate v. The Pennsylvania Co., 102 N. Y. 120, 6 N. E. 114 (1886). This case
was decided under the statutes prior to the adoption of the Penal Code of 1881, supra
note 6, which provided for both civil and criminal remedies.
"7Ibid.
"8Andrews, J., in dissenting opinion in Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
236 N. Y. 425, 435, 141 N. E. 904 (1923).
"National Commercial Bank of Albany v. Lackawanna Transportation Co., 59 App.

SURRENDER OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
previously announced policy of protecting innocent purchasers of documents
against the dangers of "spent bills" by threatening carriers failing to take
up the bill with criminal punishment. The civil liability of carriers to bona
fide purchasers of the bill for delivery without requiring surrender of the
document was thus limited-at least on the theory of conversion-to cases
where such delivery occurred after the document had been acquired by the
plaintiff ;20 this rule of limitation of liability was, however, not generally
followed in other jurisdictions ;21 it became obsolete after the adoption of
the Uniform State and'Federal Bills of Lading Acts ;22 in any event the
rule would have been unthinkable if there had been a general notion that
delivery without requiring surrender was a crime. We have previously
observed that such general notion never existed., But such negative statement
does not give the whole picture, since some courts have even gone so far as
to say that stipulations requiring surrender of the document on delivery are
"for the benefit of the carrier".2 3 Under that view a carrier who violates
such stipulation would not commit a wrong against the state, for which he
would be punishable as a criminal, but he would simply act to his own
detriment by exposing himself to the danger of having to repair eventual
damage caused by his failure to act with proper precaution. This view is
not inconsistent with the Uniform and Federal Acts, which provide that the
carrier is bound to deliver to the holder of an order bill upon his demand
if such demand is accompanied by an offer in good faith to surrender the
document properly indorsed ;24 clauses in bills of lading stipulating the duty
to require surrender of the document before delivery have been interpreted
under these statutes as being "for the benefit both of the shipper and the
carrier" ;25 the idea that violation of this clause is a crime seems totally absent.
Div. 270, 69 N. Y.
N. E. 1123 (1902).
Iowa 262, 71 N. W.
58 N. H. 203 (1877)

Supp. 396 (3d Dep't 1901), aff'd w. o. op., 172 N. Y. 596, 64
Accord: Anchor Mill Co. v. The Burlington etc. Ry. Co., 102

255 (1897); First National Bank of Peoria v. Northern Ry. Co.,
; these cases hold the carrier liable to the holder of a document

only where the latter acquired the document before delivery of the goods by the carrier
in violation of the surrender clause. Contra: Walters v. Western & Atl. R. Co., 56
Fed. 369 (C. C. Ga. 1893); Alderman Bros. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 102 Conn.

461, 129 At. 47 (1925)

noted in (1924) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 186 (decided under the

Federal Act); Ratzer v. Burlington etc. Ry. Co., 64 Minn. 245, 66 N. W. 988 (1896).

Under these decisions the carrier is also liable to a holder who acquired the document
after the wrongful delivery.
'Sheldon v. N. Y. C. and Hudson R. R. Co.,. 61 Misc. 274, 113 N. Y. Supp. 676

(Sup. Ct. 1908) ; Canandaigua Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 Misc. 327, 118 N. Y.
Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1909).
'Snpra note 19.
=Ibid.
'Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co., 103 Ga. 140, 29
S. E. 698 (1897); Famous Mfg. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 166 Iowa 361, 147
N. W. 754 (1914). See also Kaufman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 10 Ga. App.
248, 73 S. E. 592 (1912).

'49 U. S. C. A. § 88; Naw YoRK

of Lading Act § 11).

PERsoNAL PROPERTY LAW

§ 197 (Uniform Bills

'Davis v. Fruita Mercantile Co., 74 Colo. 247, 220 Pac. 983, 985 (1923); Turnbull
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The policy of the criminal statute to prevent under all circumstances the
floating around of "spent" documents as "sources of danger"2 6 to the business
community has been further weakened by the courts through resort to the
doctrine of proximate cause 2 7 In New York the application of the doctrine
to this issue crept into the law through the back door in Mairs v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. R. Co.,28 involving a nonnegotiable bill of lading, which was not
properly marked "nonnegotiable". Through forgery of a third person the
bill was altered by insertion of the word "order" before the name of the
consignee. In such shape it was indorsed to the plaintiff as security for
advances. The defendant carrier, without knowledge of the forgery, delivered the goods to the consignee. The plaintiff subsequently brought an
action against the carrier for damages caused by the latter's omission to
require surrender of the document in violation of the penal statute. The
Court of Appeals, stating generally that violation of a criminal law creates
a civil cause of action for the person injured thereby, nevertheless held for
the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had been deceived by reason
of the forgery, for which the defendant was not responsible; "the forgery
was not the direct or proximate result of the omission to take up the bill
of lading, but was the independent and felonious act of another person."2 9
This reasoning was by no means unavoidable. Since the document was
originally not negotiable, the carrier might have been let off on the simple
theory that there was no duty to take up such bill ;2 but the doctrine of
proximate cause, once invoked, was bound to remain in the field. In the
next case of Saugerties Bank v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 1 decided after
the enactment of the Uniform Laws, but involving transactions prior to their
adoption, the bill of lading was negotiable. The defendant carrier delivered
the goods to the consignee without taking it up. Several months later the
consignee changed the dates of the bill and delivered it to the plaintiff as
security for a loan. The loan not being repaid, the plaintiff brought an
v. Michigan Central R. Co., 183 Mich. 213, 150 N. W. 132 (1914); Judson v. Minneapolis and S. L. R. Co., 131 Minn. 5, 154 N. W. 506 (1915).
'Supra note 18.
"'The subject of legal cause as an element in liability for negligence has become a
stench in the nostrils of Law Review editors." Professor W. A. beavey in Mr. Justice
Cardozo and the Law of Torts (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 390, 401; (1939) 39 COL. L. REv.
20, 31; (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 372, 383; only a reference to the most recent survey by
C. Morris, On the Teaching of Legal Cause (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1087, might be
forgivable.
28175 N. Y. 409, 67 N. E. 901 (1903) ; see also Mairs v. Baltimore & Ohio i. R. Co.,
132 App. Div. 652, 117 N. Y. Supp. 370 (lst Dep't 1909) ; in accord: Merchant's Nat.
Bank v. Baltimore Steamboat Co., 102 Md. 573, 63 Atl. 108 (1906).
2175 N. Y. 409, 414 (1903).
2
Supra note 13.
236 N. Y. 425, 141 N. E. 904 (1923) ; noted in (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 425; (1924)
37 HAiv. L. REv. 908; (1924) 9 CORNELL L. Q. 319; (1924) 4 BOsToN U. L. REv. 124;
the opinion of the lower court (204 App. Div. 211) is discussed in (1923) 33 YALE
L. J. 93.

SURRENDER OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
action against the carrier for damages caused by the latter's failure to cancel
the bill on delivery in violation of the penal statute. The Court of Appeals,
in a 4 to 3 decision, affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendant. The
majority, declaring itself bound by the Mairs case,3 2 stated that, although
defendant was "probably" guilty of a crime under the statute, his omission
"would have resulted in no harm", if the independent criminal act of the
consignee had not intervened. Defendant's omission was therefore not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's damage. The minority denied the controlling
effect of the Mairs case on the ground that there the document was not
negotiable and a carrier leaving such document uncollected created no
danger to others, while here the very existence of an outstanding negotiable
bill "carried a potency of danger". The provision of the Penal Law, in the
opinion of the minority, was enacted "for the protection of the public,"
imposing the duty on the carrier to prevent the circulation of "spent" bills.
The argument of the majority that the criminal act of the consignee and
not the omission of the carrier caused the plaintiff's loss was rejected by
the minority in these terms:
"The mere intervention of a crime does not break the sequence of
cause and effect if the crime might reasonably have been foreseen when
the original default occurred. Always the outstanding bill carries this
possibility. Always there is a chance that it may be fraudulently
negotiated."33
This case completes the emasculation of the penal statute, which was
passed to cover just such situations and to protect not only the innocent
holder, but also the public at large against uncollected "spent" bills. 34 The
majority opinion overlooked completely the close interrelationship between
a criminal provision and the civil cause of action included therein; 35 it
treated the criminal liability as a phenomenon unto itself, utterly disconnected
from any civil duty; it was apparently swayed by the old rule that a crime
of a third party is not foreseeable and therefore there is no liability for
failure to anticipate such criminal act.36 This rule has never been generally
followed 3 7 But even if it had found universal acceptance, it would be of
'Supra note 28.
236 N. Y. 425, 435 (1923).
1(1924)
9 CORNELL L. Q. 319; (1924) 4 BosToN U. L. Rav. 124; (1924) 24 COL.
L. REv.425.
'Note, Restitution and the Criminal Law (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1185, 1186.
"29 Cycl. 502, citing Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S. E. 300, 88 Am. St. Rep.
25 (1901); Greenebaum v. Bornhofen, 167 Ill.
640, 646, 47 N. E. 857 (1897); Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 181 Pa. St. 40, 37 Atl. 191, 37 L. R. A.
780 (1897); see also The Lusitania, 251 Fed. 715 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); Henderson v.
Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S. E. 251 (1897); Hullinger v. Worrell, 83 Ill.
220
(1876); Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv.
633, 657.
'See Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S. E. 690 (1921), noted in (1922) 35
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no avail here on account of its inconsistency with the criminal statute, which
was designed to establish liability precisely for failure to anticipate fraudulent
abuse of documents and to prevent such abuse by compelling withdrawal
of the documents from circulation. Where the defendant had acted in direct
violation of such statute, its strict enforcement would have required a judgment for the plaintiff regardless of the fact that the crime of a third person
added an additional cause of injury. Since the doctrine of proximate cause
has subsequently been applied in cases arising under the Federal Bills of
Lading Act,38 there is no guaranty that the courts would reach a different
result if the case would come up today, because the provisions for civil
liability for delivery without cancellation of the bill follow the same purpose
as the old criminal statute and might therefore be interpreted in the same
manner, although they emphasize the protection of the bona fide purchaser
in unambiguous language.
The majority opinion in the Saugerties case mentions in a dictum the
criminal character of the defendant's omission to take up the document,
but holds that this omission would have been harmless without the intervening crime of the consignee. It thus contemplates the possibility of a
harmless criminal act. Such apparent paradoxical concepts seem to be
possible only in the absence of the general moral condemnation with which
we usually react against punishable conduct. The social stigma which is
attached to larceny or embezzlement or to other familiar crimes, is not
a priori the necessary concomitant of the omission of a carrier to cancel a
bill of lading on delivery, because such omission is not a priori injurious to
the welfare of individuals and of society. The decisions in civil cases denying the carrier's liability for such omission seem to be explainable only on
account of the absence of any spontaneous reaction that the omission as
such is a crime. If the penal statute had been generally accepted as strict
prohibition of such omission, irrespective of intent to defraud or injurious
consequences, and if the necessity of protecting the bona fide purchaser had
been more clearly perceived, the results in civil cases would necessarily have
been different.
HAav. L. REv. 467; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426, 42 Am. Rep. 508 (1882) ; Fottler

v. Moseley, 185 Mass. 563, 565, 70 N. E. 1040 (1904): "To create a liability, it never
is necessary that a wrongdoer should contemplate the particulars of the injury from
his wrongful act, nor the precise way in which the damages will be inflicted. He need
not even expect that damage will result at all, if he does that which is unlawful and
which involves a risk of injury." Mead v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co.,
68 Mo. App. 92, 101 (1896): "No wrongdoer ought to be allowed to apportion or
qualify his wrong, and as a wrong has actually happened whilst his own wrongful act
was in force and operation, he ought not to be permitted to set up as a defense that
there was a more immediate cause of the loss, if that cause was put in operation by
his own wrongful act." Brower v. N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., 91
N. J. Law 190, 103 Atl. 166, 1 A. L. R. 734 (1918); Olson v. Gill Home Investment
Co., 58 Wash. 151, 108 Pac. 140 (1910).

"See infra text to note 59.
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It is perhaps regrettable that this strict construction has not been favored.
In so far as warehousemen are concerned, there is authority for such rigorous
enforcement of criminal sanctions. In an early Iowa decision8 9 involving a
criminal prosecution against a warehouseman under a statute prohibiting
the sale, transfer, shipment or removal of property for which a receipt has
been given without the written consent of the holder of the receipt, 40 the
accused attempted to defend on the ground that the holder of the receipt
was present when he shipped the goods to a third person, and that he had
given his verbal assent thereto. His conviction was affirmed on the theory
that the statute was not intended for the protection only of the holder of
the receipt, but for the protection of the community as well. Therefore, the
defendant could not innocently ship the goods beyond his control, even with
the verbal assent of the holder, because such an act would furnish to the
holder "the means of perpetrating a fraud, which it is one of the objects
of the statute to prevent." 41 In a similar case the Supreme Court of Idaho2
declared that such statute is intended "as an arbitrary statute, prohibiting
the act itself, irrespective of the intent with which the act may be committed.
If it were not arbitrary in its terms, it would be a practical nullity. ' 43 On
the basis of these authorities it was held in North Dakota44 that section 54
of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,4 5 which makes it a crime for a
warehouseman to deliver goods without obtaining the negotiable receipt
outstanding therefor, does not permit the lawful owner to hold a warehouseman liable for damages for his refusal to deliver goods, where the document
was-lost, even though an indemnity bond is furnished ;46 the court recognized
the interdependence of criminal and civil law by saying that no person could
be held civilly liable for not doing an act which the statute denominates as
a crime.
The application of such reasoning to carriers and bills of lading under
the old penal statute would have necessarily resulted in the corresponding
rule that a person must be held civilly liable for doing an act which the
'State v. Stevenson, 52 Iowa 701, 3 N. W. 743 (1879).
'The statute is similar to the New York Penal Law § 364.
"52 Iowa 701, 703, 3 N. W. 743 (1879).
'State v. Henzell, 17 Idaho 725, 107 Pac. 67, 27 L. R. A. (N.s.) 159 (1910).
"107 Pac. 67, 69 (1910).

"Dahl v. Winter-Truesdell-Diercks Co., 62 N. D. 351, 237 N. W. 202 (1931), noted

in (1931) 3 DAKOTA L. R.v. 425. Apparently contra: Bunnell v. Ward, 241 Mih.
404, 217 N. W. 68 (1928) (section 54 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipt Act does
not prohibit the warehouseman from delivering partnership property to one partner
without obtaining the receipt).
"NEw

YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW

§ 138.

"The plaintiff had neglected to comply with the provisions of the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act requiring court action in case of lost receipts: See Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act § 14 (NEw YORK GENERAL BusixNEss LAW § 100). For similar provisions

regarding bills of lading, see New York Personal Property Law § 203 (Uniform Bills of

Lading Act § 17) ; 49 U. S. C. A. § 94.
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statute denominates as a crime. We have seen that the courts have not
consistently enforced this theory. After the enactment of the Federal Bills
of Lading Act it became even more obvious that omission to take up a
negotiable bill on delivery was not a priori considered a wrong, let alone
a wrong against the public, which deserved criminal punishment. The cases
show that even more dearly than does the absence of a criminal provision
47
corresponding to section 54 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act.
To be sure, the civil provisions of the Act impose liability on the carrier to
a bona fide purchaser where the former's omission to withdraw the document
from circulation results in its failure to deliver the goods to the latter.48
The basis of the carrier's liability is tortious negligence. 49 Moreover, if the

goods are delivered to a person who is not the consignee and not in possession of the bill, but who is merely to be notified of the shipment, the shipper
may hold the carrier for conversion 50 or breach of contract,8 1 where the bill
is made out to the order of the shipper and expressly stipulates that it shall
be surrendered on delivery. The interpretation of the surrender clause as a
protection for the shipper and the bona fide purchaser is therefore justified.5 2
On the other hand, there is not only no indication that the mere act of
delivery without requiring surrender of the bill is unlawful, but there are
statements of the highest authority to the effect that the Federal Bills of
Supra note 45.
U. S. C. A. §§ 91, 92; NEW YoRx PERsoxA.Ir PROPERTY LAw §§ 200, 201 (Uniform
Bills of Lading Act §§ 14, 15).
'Chesapeake S.S. Co. of Baltimore v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, 102 Md. 589, 63 Atl.
113 (1906); Walters v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., supra note 19.
'First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Rogers, Brown & Co., 273 Fed. 529 (W. D. Wash.
1921) ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Myers, 173 Ark. 747, 293 S. W. 15 (1927) ; Alderman
Bros. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., supra note 19; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mengel
Co., 220 Ky. 289, 295 S. W. 183 (1927) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Johnsop, 226 Ky.
322, 10 S. W. (2d) 1104 (1928); Orange Nat. Bank v. Southern Pacific Co., 162
La. 223, 110 So. 329, 56 A. L. R. 1167 (1926); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Greenwald
Packing Corporation, 24 Ohio App. 497, 157 N. E. 809 (1926); Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 125 Tenn. 658, 148 S. W. 671
(1911); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Aylor, 153 Va. 575, 150 S. E. 252 (1929),
cert. denied, 282 U. S. 847, 51 Sup. Ct. 26 (1930) ; 10 C. J. 259. See also Morse Hubbard
Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co., 286 Ill. App. 163, 3 N. E. (2d) 93 (1936); Farmers
Grain & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 120 Kan. 21, 121 Kan. 10, 245
Pac. 734 (1926). As to the liability of warehousemen under similar circumstances, see
Bogle's Administrator v. Thompson, 230 Ky. 538, 20 S. W. (2d) 173 (1929); Joy v.
Farmers Nat. Bank of Chickasha, 158 Okla. 1, 11 Pac. (2d) 1074 (1932); Farmer's
Bank of Weston v. Ellis, 122 Ore. 266, 258 Pac. 186 (1927).
'Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Roe, 96 Fla. 429, 118 So. 155 (1928), noted in
(1929) 14 CORNELL L. Q. 210; the theory of the action is based on the so-called
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. A. § 20, ff 11,
providing that the carrier is liable "for the full actual loss, damage or injury to such
property caused by it".
"King v. Barbarin, 249 Fed. 303 (C. C. A. 6th 1917); Babbitt v. The Grand
Trunk Western Ry. Co., 285 Ill. 267, 120 N. E. 803 (1918) ; both decisions are based
on the Carmack Amendment, supra note 51. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bank of
America, 23 Fed. (2d) 939 (N. D. Ill. 1928), aff'd, 29 Fed. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 7th
1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 847, 49 Sup. Ct. 345 (1929) (no protection for assignee
of bill, who had knowledge of vendee's fraudulent misappropriation of goods).
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Lading Act contains nothing which imposes upon the carrier a specific duty
to take up the bill. In Pere Marquette Ry. Ca. v. F. F. French & Co., 53
a bill of lading to the order of the shipper and containing the surrender
clause as well as the stipulation to notify the buyer for whom the goods were
sent, was endorsed to a bank, with draft attached. The banlks collection
agent delivered the bill to the buyer, without payment of the draft, and the
buyer obtained delivery from the carrier without surrender of the bill. The
buyer, refusing to pay and fo keep the goods, returned the bill to the bank,
which sent it back to the shipper. In the latter's action against the carrier
for wrongful delivery without requiring surrender of the document, a judgment for the plaintiff 54 was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States on the ground that the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser under
the Act,55 since he had knowledge of the facts when he took back the draft
and the bill from the bank. In this connection the court declared:
"There is nothing in the act which imposes upon the carrier a specific duty to the shipper to take up the bill of lading. Under section 8
[49 U. S. C. A. § 88] the carrier is not obliged to make delivery except
upon production and surrender of the bill of lading; but it is not prohibited from doing so. 56 If instead of insisting upon the production and
surrender of the bill it chooses to deliver in reliance upon the assurance
that the deliveree has it, so far as the duty to the shipper is concerned,
the only risk it runs is that the person who says that he has the bill
may not have it. If such proves to be the case the carrier is liable for
conversion and must, of course, indemnify the shipper for any loss
which results. Such liability arises not from the statute but from the
obligation which the carrier assumes under the bill of lading."57
The court went on to say that the shipper's action for conversion would
lie only "where the failure to require the presentation and surrender of the
bill is the cause of the shipper losing his goods", s but that the mere failure
to require surrender of the document does not make the delivery a conversion, "where delivery is made to a person who has the bill or who has
authority from the holder of it, and the cause of the shipper's loss is not
the failure to require surrender of the bill but the improper acquisition of
it by the deliveree or his improper subsequent conduct."' 59 Since, in the
63254 U. S. 538, 41 Sup. Ct. 195 (1920) noted in (1921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 379;
(1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 589.
"'204 Mich. 578, 171 N. W. 491 (1919).
w49 U. S. C. A. § 91.
'Italics ours.
w254 U. S. 538, 546. Accord: Alderman Bros. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. C., supra

note 19.
11254 U. S. 538, 546, citing Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., supra note 52;

Turnbull v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., supra note 25; Judson v. Minneapolis and
St. Louis R. R. Co., supra note 25.
254 U. S. 538, 547, citing Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. Savannah, Florida
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instant case, the cause of loss was not the failure of the defendant carrier
to take up the bill, but the wrongful surrender of the document by the bank's
collection agent to the buyer, the carrier was not liable.
The result of this decision is obvious enough: The inflexible prohibition
of delivery without surrender of the bill of lading, which makes such delivery
a crime, is not consistent with the Federal Act and therefore not applicable
to interstate shipments. 60 (Since a different law for intrastate shipment
would not be tolerable, 61 it would seem that such criminal statutes are
also inconsistent with the Uniform State Law.) Such delivery is not
prohibited, but it simply involves certain risks. If it is the proximate
cause of the shipper's loss the carrier is bound to indemnify him. This
obligation arises under the general provision for liability for misdelivery 62
and under the contract of transportation as embodied in the bill; if omission
to cancel the bill makes it impossible for the carrier to deliver the g6ods to
the bona fide purchaser of the document, liability of the carrier is based
on the specific provision of section 11 of the Act.63 Moreover, delivery to
the true owner of the goods or to a person entitled to possession may always
be set up by the carrier as a defense in an action brought against him by
the bailor subsequent to such delivery, 64 while such defense is expressly
& Western Ry. Co., supra note 23; Famous Mfg. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry Co.,
supra note 23; Nelson Grain Co. v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 174 Mich. 80, 140 N. W. 486
(1913); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. of Texas v. Gilbreath, 144 S. W. 1051 CTex. Civ.
App. 1912).
'Miller v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 205 App. Div. 663, 668, 200 N. Y. Supp. 287
(1st Dep't 1923):
"In so far as section 365 of the Penal Law of this State, prohibiting the
delivery of property for which a negotiable bill of lading has been issued,
unless the bill is surrendered, conflicts with the Federal Law regulating interstate shipments, it must be deemed to give -way to the Federal legislation upon
the subject which has supremacy in regulation of interstate shipments of
commerce."
"See Llewellyn in HANDBOOx NAT.CoNF. Comm'Rs ox ,UNIroam STATE LAws (1937)
86: "No man and no legislature can stand one law which governs a shipment from
Bingbiampton to Buffalo and another from Buffalo to Chicago." See also New York
Personal Property Law § 227 (Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 41) providing that under
certain circumstances all "parties interested shall be justified in assuming" that the buyer
may retain the bill. There is no provision corresponding to this section in the Federal
Act. See generally 1 WILLISTON ON StLES (2d ed. 1924) § 290.
"Alderman Bros. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., supra note 19. Cf. supra note 8.

"Supra note 9.

'Miller v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., supra note 60; the case refers to the Sales
Act-NEw YoaK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw §§ 101 (2), 226 Uniform Sales Act §§ 20 (2),
40-which provides that a consignment to the seller's order is only for purposes of security;
it has been held that under an f.o. 6. contract the risk of loss passes to the buyer on
delivery to the carrier, Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N. Y. 413,
135 N. E. 834 (1922), where the seller has retained title to the property merely for
purposes of security; the opinion construes the Sales Act with the provisions of the
Federal Bills of Lading Act in 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 89, 97, 98, holding that "it was intended to confer on carriers transporting goods in interstate commerce the right to
deliver the goods to the true owner and to make such delivery a complete defense
to an action by a shipper who holds an order bill of lading. .. .' See also Salant v.

SURRENDER OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
prohibited if the action is brought by a bona fide purchaser of the bill."5
The practical result of this situation seems to be that the old penal statutes
of New York and other states which make delivery without surrender of
the negotiable bill of lading a crime have been superseded by the modem
development of the law. The strict enforcement of these statutes, which,
if the absence of reported criminal prosecutions against carriers is not misleading, apparently has never been attempted, would outlaw delivery without
actual surrender regardless of circumstances: It would make no difference
whether the bill has been lost, stolen or destroyed, or whether there has
been misdirection, misplacement, tornado, flood, holdup, air-mail accident
or any other contingency which might postpone its surrender. 66 The carrier
should obviously not be required to withhold the goods from the owner and
to impede the free flow of -commerce where the equities of the situation
demand prompt delivery. 67 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that
the policy of the old statutes to compel withdrawal of negotiable bills from
circulation as soon as the goods have reached their destination is a very
sound one. A satisfactory compromise between these conflicting interests
has been worked out through the practice of indemnity bonds; under such
practice the carrier takes an indemnity bond from a surety company or from
the deliveree in an amount exceeding the value of the property, and may
then deliver the goods to the person demanding them without surrender of
the bill. 68 It has been held that such indemnity 'contracts are not unlawful
under the Federal Bills of Lading Act, since the carrier is not prohibited
from making delivery without requiring surrender, but may do so at its peril;
consequently "there is no impropriety in the carrier taking indemnity against
loss on account of the risk which such delivery involves,"6 9 even though
the carrier expressly promised not to deliver without surrender of the
document; "the prime object of transportation" being prompt delivery, the
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 188 App. Div. 851, 855, 177 N. Y. Supp. 475 (1st Dep't 1919),
aff'd w. o. op., 231 N. Y. 607, 132 N. E. 907 (1921). Cf. Schules Pure Grape Juice

Co. v. Mills, 146 Misc. 823, 263 N. Y. Supp. 754 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd w. o. op., 241

App. Div. 804, 270 N. Y. Supp. 930 (1st Dep't 1934) holding the carrier estopped from
insisting on the production of the bill, where carrier had delivered without asking
for the document and without questioning deliveree's right to possession.

'SSupra note 9.
"Northwestern Casualty and Surety Co. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 19 Fed. (2d)
868 (C. C. A. 7th 1927).
67Ibid.

'See Morse Hubbard Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co., supra note 50, referring to the
rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission relative to this usage. "The rules of the
Interstate Commerce Commission .. . place upon the carrier the duty to obtain the production and surrender of the bill of lading before the delivery of the goods. These rules
also provide what the carrier shall do when a bill of lading of this kind is not produced
or surrendered. The provision in such case is that the carrier shall take an indemnity
bond to the amount of 125% of the value of the goods for its own protection and for the
protection of the shipper."
'Supra note 66.
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parties may arrange for an earlier delivery than would be possible if they
would have to await the arrival of the document, and the indemnity contract
to secure the carrier or other participants against loss by reason of such
delivery is not immoral, because the carrier does not relieve itself from
liability to a holder of the bill.70 If delivery without surrender were considered a crime, the indemnity contract would, of course, be void as against
public policy, since no one is permitted to insure himself or others against
the consequences of a criminal act which he is about to commit. Such indemnity contracts are thus intended to facilitate delivery without surrender
by securing protection against its perils. This practice has not only been
sanctioned by rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission 70 but in three
jurisdictions it has also been combined with the statutory prohibition of
delivery without surrender. This has been accomplished by maintaining the
principle that such delivery is unlawful and criminal, but by admitting an
exception to such principle: The statutes of Arkansas,7-1 Washington 72 and
Wyoming 73 provide that the carrier is guilty of a crime, if he makes such
delivery without requiring cancellation of the bill, un1ess a bond or undertaking is given therefor at the time of such delivery 74 conditioned that the
recipient of the goods shall within a reasonable time hand over to the carrier
the original document issued for such goods, or shall pay the value of said
property upon demand in case of wrongful delivery. 75 These statutes are
evidently based on the theory that an exemption from the general outlawry
of delivery without withidrawal of the outstanding bill is only permissible
where proper precautions are taken against possible dangers. The courts
have therefore generally enforced such indemnity contracts. 76 This intermediate rule, forbidding delivery without surrender or without indemnity,
seems to offer the best solution. Its consistent enforcement would probably make the use of criminal sanctions unnecessary except where the
carrier acted in bad faith or with intent to defraud, 77 an element which was
absent in all reported cases. The situation is not the same with regard to
70Ibid. "That a carrier might not be permitted to recover on such an obligation
where, knowingly and in bad faith, it delivers the goods to one not entitled to them, is
beside the question." Even delivery of the goods under an order of the court does not
entirely relieve the carrier where the bill has been lost or destroyed, note 46, supra.
"Supra note 68.
7'DIG. OF STATS. § 949 (1937).

'Remington's Rev. Stats., tit. 14, § 2647.
"'Rev. Stats., c. 12, § 12-107 (1931).
"'Supra note 72.
"ISupranote 73.
"'Supra note 66; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
174 Ark. 318, 295 S. W. 705 (1927); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Vanden-Boom, 30
S. W. (2d) 186 (Mo. App. 1930) ; Latimer v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co., 56 S. W. (2d)
933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See also St. Louis South Western Ry. Co. v. CookBahlan Feed Mf.g. Co., 187 Ark. 106, 58 S. W. (2d) 428 (1933).
'Cf.49 U. S. C. A. § 121.

SURRENDER OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
warehousemen, since it cannot be said that the "prime object" of a contract
of storage is "prompt delivery" ;78 the functional difference of storage and
transportation therefore justifies the existence of the criminal provision of
section 54 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 9 and the absence of a
corresponding provision in the Bills of Lading Act. The warehouseman,
who has only to decide whether he should permit the goods to leave the
warehouse, is guilty of a reckless disregard of the property rights of others
if he relinquishes the goods without surrender of the negotiable receipt,
where he knows that such receipt is outstanding. Such recklessness may
well be deemed criminal. But criminal sanction for failure to demand
surrender of the bill of lading could not be imposed arbitrarilyon the carrier,
whose normal operation of shipping the goods from one place to another
might be unduly hindered by too much delay.
In the application of civil remedies the distinction between actions brought
by the shipper and those brought by a bona fide purchaser of the document
should be more dearly observed. Although the Supreme Court in the
French case 0 applied the doctrine of proximate cause to an action of the
former type, some courts seem to be willing to extend its application to
actions of the latter category.8 1 This might perpetuate the holding of the
majority opinion in the Saugerties case 2 in spite of express provisions of
the Uniform State and Federal Bills of Lading Act granting civil remedies
to the bona fide purchaser even after delivery of the goods.83 Since the
negotiable character of the bill of lading would be meaningless without the
strongest protection for its holder, only the philosophy of the minority opinion in the Saugerties case would seem to be in harmony with both the old
and the new statute. It should therefore be made dear that omission to
cancel a negotiable document is always the proximate cause of ensuing damage
to the bona fide purchaser, regardless of other intervening causes, even
though the rule might be more flexible in actions brought by the shipper.
The old penal statute anticipated this policy in spite of the fact that bills of
lading were not fully negotiable at common law ;84 its meaning should not
be obscured today, even though the legislative technique of handling this
problem as one of criminal law might not have been the right approach.
This problem of securing protection for a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable document of title is not limited to bills of lading and warehouse
"SuIpra text to note 70.

7'Supra note 11.

"Supra note 53.

"See Alderman Bros. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., supra note 19.
2Supra note 31.
Supra note 9.
G'See 2 WI.LiSTOx O1 SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 406.
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receipts. The category of "documents of title" is broadly defined in the
Uniform Sales Act as including
"any bill of lading, dock warrant, warehouse receipt or order for the
delivery of goods, or any other document used in the ordinary course
of business in the sale or transfer of goods, as proof of the possession
or control of the goods, or authorizing or purporting to authorize the
possessor of the document to transfer or receive, either by indorsement
or by delivery, goods represented by such document." 85
Since the Uniform Bills of Lading and Warehouse Receipts Acts and
the Federal Bills of Lading Act do not apply to documents of title other
than bills of lading or warehouse receipts, the only statutory provisions
coextensive with this -broad definition- are those of the Sales Act itself.8 6
The old penal provisions could eventually be construed as applicable to all
documents of title, if they were not so framed as to apply only to documents
issued by carriers and their agents. Problems of civil and criminal liability
may therefore arise in connection with documents of title other than bills
of lading or warehouse receipts which are not controlled by any statute.
The assumption that "if any form of document was used in commerce
as a symbol of the goods, the law would recognize the mercantile custom,
if the goods themselves were in such a situation as not to be readily delivered"87 is evidently based on the same broad concept as the definition of
the Sales Act, recognizing the possibility of giving to any document "used
in the ordinary course of business" the attributes of a document of title.
The courts, however, seem to disapprove that theory. Thus in Manny v.
Wilson,88 itwas held-one judge dissenting-that the criminal provision
of the Penal Law prohibiting delivery of the goods without surrender of
the document did not apply to a receipt issued by an automobile manufacturer
for an automobile chassis and stating that the complete vehicle was to be
delivered only on return of the receipt properly indorsed. The manufacturer's
liability to the indorsee of the receipt for delivering the property without requiring surrender of the document was denied on the ground that only bills
of lading and warehouse receipts have come to possess attributes of negotiability, but that it has not become customary thus to deal with receipts
like that involved in this action.89 The decision was not made under the
Sales Act, but since the Sales Act contains no provision similar to section 14
of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act 9° or to section 11 of the Uniform
8'NEW YoRx PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW

mSupra note 4.

§ 156 (Uniform Sales Act § 76).

s2 Wu.LIsTON ON SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 405.
5s137 App. Div. 140, 122 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1st Dep't 1910) aff'd w. o. op., 203 N. Y.

535, 96 N. E. 1121 (1911).

"Accord: State v. Bryant, 63 Md. 66 (1884).
ONE~w YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 200. But cf. New York Personal Property
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Warehouse Receipts Act,91 the same result may be reached again, although
its justification is highly uncertain. There would seem to be no reason why
private agreements not involving carriers or warehousemen as participants
could not effectively create documents of force similar to bills of lading or
warehouse receipts. The refusal of the court to enforce such agreement is
certainly not consistent with the broad definition of the term "doctiment of
title" contained in the Sales Act; it rather implies that bills of lading and
warehouse receipts are the only documents of title in existence. A more
recent dictum that "dock receipts" are not documents of title9 2 under the
Federal Bills of Lading Act seems to point in the same direction, while an
Illinois decision held that a conditional sales contract with a promissory
93
note attached was a document of title within the definition of the Sales Act.
Similar difficulties exist with regard to delivery orders on warehousemen,
which are sent by the seller to the buyer; although such delivery orders are
expressly included in the definition of documents of title, the courts have
held that they do not pass title to the buyer if the seller retains the warehouse receipt.9 4 Their status is therefore also uncertain.
Conclusion
Delivery of goods without cancellation of the negotiable document of title
outstanding therefor is unquestionably dangerous and should be prevented.
On the other hand, the kaleidoscopic needs of modem business transactions
require a flexible commercial law, and such flexibility requires that the
deterrent effect of criminal liability should not be attached to acts which
under modem conditions are justified or, at worst, are looked upon as mere
torts. 95 There is evidence that the criminal provision of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act has deterred warehousemen from delivering goods to
persons unable to produce the receipt.9 6 The-perhaps regrettable-absence
of a corresponding deterrent provision in the Bills of Lading Acts implies
that a less rigid rule for carriers and bills of lading has superseded the old
Law § 114b (Uniform Sales Act § 33b) which could lead to a different result than that
reached in Manny v. Wilson.
9NEw YoRx GENERAL BusINEss LAW § 98.
-'Chandler Motor Car Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra note 13.
HBixson v. Ward, 254 Ili. App. 505 (1929).
"Horst v. Montauk Brewing Co., 118 App. Div. 300, 103 N. Y. Supp. 381 (1st
Dep't 1907), aff'd w. o. op., 192 N. Y. 555, 85 N. E. 1111 (1908) ; Kirsch v. Roulston,
Beckert & Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 246 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Robinson v. All-Lite Sales Co.,
202 N. Y. Supp. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Calif. Animals Product Co. v. Lappin, 54 R. I.
75, 170 Atl. 71 (1934). See also Cundill v. Lewis, 245 N. Y. 383, 157 19. E. 502 (1927).
Cf. Salmon v. Brandmeier, 104 App. Div. 66, 93 N. Y. Supp. 271 (2d Dep't 1905)
where apparently no warehouse receipt was outstanding.
"See MIUaR, CRm llAL LAW (1934) 20-23.
"Dahl v. Winter-Truesdell-Diercks Co., supra note 44. Apparently the question of
liability for failure to cancel the document has been litigated much less frequently with
regard to warehousemen.
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penal statutes. Any future revision of the law should therefore consider this problem. Its solution seems to be the requirement of a sufficient
bond or undertaking 97 if there is no cancellation or surrender of the document and adoption of the minority opinion in the Saugertiescase9 s by making
it clear that the action of the bona fide purchaser against the carrier who
fails to cancel the negotiable bill on delivery could not be defeated through
intervening misconduct of other persons.
Any attempt at clarification of the subject should also include a reexamination of the concet of "document of title" in view of the uncertain
extent of that category. Such re-examination, in the opinion of the writer,
indicates the necessity of amending the statutes for the purpose of greater
conformity with the broad definition of the Sales Act.99
"Supra notes 68, 71-73.
"Supra note 31.
"Supra note 85.

